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TAXATION OF PRE-SALE, INTERCORPORATE
DIVIDENDS: WATERMAN STEAMSHIP CORP.
The majority stockholder of a large eastern motor carrier sought
to acquire ships and terminal facilities capable of transporting con-
tainerized freight between ports on the Gulf of Mexico and the eastern
seaboard. Waterman Steamship Corporation (Waterman) operated
such facilities through two wholly-owned subsidiaries, Pan-Atlantic,
a water carrier, and Gulf Florida, a terminal and stevedoring business.
Waterman had a basis of $700,000 in the stock of these subsidiaries,
but because the profits had been retained and reinvested in the enter-
prises, the stock had a fair market value of $3,500,000. After rejecting
the trucker's $3,500,000 cash offer to purchase the stock of the sub-
sidiaries, Waterman counteroffered to sell the stock for $700,000
following a declaration and payment by the subsidiaries of a dividend
of $2,800,000 accumulated earnings and profits. The motor carrier
accepted this counteroffer, and Waterman caused Pan-Atlantic to
declare and pay the dividend with a promissory note due one month
after the declaration. Waterman then signed the agreement consum-
mating the sale of its shares in the subsidiaries. Within two hours, the
purchaser loaned $2,800,000 to Pan-Atlantic with which it paid the
note representing the dividend.
On its consolidated income tax return Waterman excluded from
taxable income the amount of the note, claiming it was an inter-
corporate dividend deductible under the current section 243 of the
Internal Revenue Code.- The Commissioner asserted a deficiency,
contending the note was a subterfuge and recasting the dividend as
1 Section 243, as it then read, provided:
In the case of a corporation . . . there shall be allowed as a deduction an
amount equal to 85 percent of the amount received as dividends . . . from
a domestic corporation ....
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §243(a), as amended, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§243(a) (1) -(3).
The pertinent section now reads:
In the case of a corporation, there shall be allowed as a deduction an amount
equal to the following percentages of the amount received as dividends from
a domestic corporation which is subject to taxation under this chapter:
(1) 85 percent, in the case of dividends other than dividends described
in paragraph (2) or (3);
(2) 100 percent, in the case of dividends received by a small business
investment company operating under the Small Business Investment Act of
1958; and
(3) 100 percent. in the case of qualifying dividends (as defined in sub-
section (b) (1)).
A qualifying dividend is one paid by a corporation in the same affiliated group as the
distributee. Corporations includible in an affiliated group are those related through
stock ownership with a common parent corporation possessing at least 80% of the
voting power of group subsidiaries. INT. IEv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 243(b) (1), 1504(a).
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part of the purchase price taxable as capital gain.2 However, the Tax
Court upheld the claimed deduction in Waterman Steamship Corp.,3
ruling that a subsidiary's dividend distribution of accumulated earnings
to its parent immediately before the parent sells its stock in the sub-
sidiary qualifies as a deductible intercorporate dividend where no
purchase agreement is consummated until after the dividend has been
declared and paid.
The Tax Court majority framed the issue as whether, given the
contemplated sale immediately following the subsidiary's distribution,
the dividend form of the transaction should be respected for federal tax
purposes.4 The court acknowledged the taxpayer's right to reduce its
taxable income by adopting that course which produced the smallest
tax burden.5 The opinion then stated that because substantially tax-
free intercorporate dividends are authorized by the Code, and since
the dividend was an integral part of the only transactional structure
compatible with the purchaser's business objectives, the transaction
should be treated according to the form in which it was cast: payment
of an intercorporate dividend.'
Once a dividend was found, the ultimate result was determined by
deciding to whom it was paid and taxable. Treasury Regulation
1.61-9(c) provides that dividends declared and paid before the sale
of the underlying stock constitute income taxable to the seller.7  Once
an enforceable agreement has been consummated, however, the buyer
becomes the beneficial owner of the stock and is entitled to, and taxable
upon, receipt of any dividend paid.' The court distinguished "between
a dividend declared and paid to the seller after execution of a written
agreement for sale of stock and a dividend declared and paid prior to
execution of a written agreement for sale of stock but after a general
understanding as to the sale of the stock (not finally reduced to writ-
ing). . . . " 9 Admitting the distinction was "a shadowy one," 10 the
court emphasized that absent an enforceable sales agreement, the pur-
chaser had no right to the stock and the seller remained the only party
2 See INT. REV. CODE o 1954, §§ 1201, 1221.
3 50 T.C. 650 (1968) (decision of Scott, J., reviewed by the court), appeal pend-
ing, Commissioner v. Waterman Steamship Corp., No. 27563 (5th Cir., filed March 28,
1969), noted in 22 VAND. L. REv. 228 (1968).
4 50 T.C. at 661.
5 Where the transaction is carried out in a recognized form to accomplish its
purpose and is not a sham or subterfuge, its substance should not be con-
sidered to differ from its form merely because the same result might have
been accomplished by the parties by another method which would have
produced a higher tax.
Id. at 665.
6Id. at 665-66.
7Treas. Reg. § 1.61-9(c).
8 See Joseph L. O'Brien Co., 35 T.C. 750 (1961), aff'd, 301 F.2d 813 (3d Cir.
1962); Sam E. Wilson, Jr., 27 T.C. 976 (1957), affd per curiam, 255 F.2d 702 (5th
Cir. 1958).
9Id. at 664.
10 Id.
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"who bears the operating risks of the business and stands to benefit
from profits or suffer detriment from losses." " Since the Waterman
transaction was of the latter variety,' - the majority concluded that the
note, and the cash received upon payment thereof, was properly de-
ducted from the taxpayer's income under the intercorporate dividend
provision.13
In dissent, three judges questioned whether a dividend had in fact
been paid: "The plain and unadulterated fact is that no dividend was
declared or paid by [the subsidiaries to the taxpayer]. The note issued
was merely a piece of paper which served only a temporary purpose
and disappeared." "4 However, although the majority and the dissent
seem squarely at odds on the character of the $2,800,000 payment, the
theory of the dissent is unclear. They may have contended that no
valid indebtedness was created by the note; therefore, no dividend was
paid. Or they may have reasoned that even if the note created a valid
subsidiary-to-parent indebtedness, that finding does not foreclose the
issue whether payment of that note must be characterized as a dividend
or a portion of the purchase price.
"1Id. This phrase, from Steel Improvement & Forge Co. v. Commissioner, 314
F.2d 96, 98 (6th Cir. 1963), rev'g 36 T.C. 265 (1961), was apparently thought to
encapsulate the Sixth Circuit's formulation of the beneficial ownership test. In that
case a United States corporation agreed to sell the outstanding stock of its Canadian
subsidiary to a Canadian purchaser conditioned upon the declaration of a dividend.
The subsidiary paid the dividend with funds supplied by the purchaser. Because the
intercorporate dividend deduction applies only to dividends paid by "a domestic cor-
poration which is subject to [United States] taxation," the U.S. parent argued the
dividend form of the transaction should be disregarded and the amount received
treated as part of the purchase price taxable as capital gain. See INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 243(a). The court apparently reasoned that because the conditioning event
(payment of a dividend) was within the parent's control, the purchaser had an
enforceable right to the stock and was, therefore, the beneficial owner of the stock
at the time the dividend was declared and paid. See E. I. DuPont de Nemours
Powder Co. v. Schlottman, 218 F. 353 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 705 (1914).
The form of a dividend paid to the parent was recast as a dividend paid to the pur-
chaser, with the immediate channeling of those funds back through the subsidiary as
part of the purchase price taxable as capital gain. In Steel Improvement, both the
Tax Court and Sixth Circuit recognized the validity of the dividend in the pre-sale
context; the basis for reversal turned on the finding that the taxpayer was not the
beneficial owner at the time the dividend was declared and paid.
12 The [seller's counteroffer] was intended to result in [the parent-taxpayer]
receiving in cash an amount it considered to be the approximate value of the
[subsidiaries'] assets . . . without realizing taxable income . . . Since the
transaction was planned to accomplish these purposes, the parties were careful
that no firm contract for sale . . . was entered until after [the subsidiary]
had declared a dividend and paid the dividend to [the parent-taxpayer] by
delivery of its promissory note ....
50 T.C. at 661.
1 Section 243(a) (1) authorizes a deduction of 85% of the amount received by a
corporate taxpayer as dividends from a domestic corporation subject to federal income
taxation. The section thereby reduces the effective maximum tax rate on dividends
received by a corporation to 7.2% because the corporate tax rate of 48% is imposed
on only 15% of the dividends received.
Because the taxpayer recognized no taxable income on payment of the note,
judgment was entered pursuant to FED. R. Crv. P. 50, apparently to allow deter-
mination of the tax due on 15% of the amount received as a dividend.
'4 50 T.C. at 666-67 (Tannenwald, Raum, Dawson & Simpson, Ji., dissenting).
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A. Validity of the Debt
Although the Commissioner admitted that a dividend might prop-
erly be paid by a promissory note,', the facts that the subsidiary's
liability was secured by the purchaser, that the principal amount of the
note was subtracted from the purchase price of the stock and that the
subsidiary two hours after the sale paid the note with funds obtained
from the purchaser, convinced the dissenters that the note representing
the dividend was "merely a piece of paper, which served only a tem-
porary purpose and disappeared." " But the dissent cited no authority
to support this conclusion.
In Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner," the Commissioner con-
tested the deductibility of interest payments, contending as in the instant
case that the dividend distribution of a debt instrument did not create
a valid corporate indebtedness. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit allowed the deduction, finding that neither the parent-subsidiary
relationship, nor the transformation of an original equity interest
into a debt interest, nor the alleged thin capitalization resulting from
the transaction, nor the lack of any business purpose other than that
of avoiding tax, was either singly or in combination sufficient to declare
the debt invalid." Other factors by which the validity of a purported
debt are to be judged were developed in Nassau Lens Co. v. Commis-
sioner.?9 They are an intention to repay, the extent to which the debt
instrument bore a substantial risk of the enterprise, and the subordina-
tion of the instruments20 With these factors one could support a
finding that the note was too ephemeral to be considered a valid debt,
but in the face of the Kraft case this would be a rather strained holding.
Moreover, it would serve only to avoid the more difficult and important
issue in the case: the character of the payment made. Since the sub-
sidiaries could have borrowed $2,800,000 from a third party and paid
the dividend in cash, it does not necessarily follow that that payment
should be characterized as a dividend for federal tax purposes.
B. Dividend v. Purchase Price
The Waterman transaction can be viewed in three alternative
ways. First, a court could find that the form chosen by the taxpayer
directly reflected the substance of the transaction: an intercorporate
dividend followed by a sale of the parent's stock in the subsidiary."
15 50 T.C. at 658 n.1.
16 Id. at 667.
17 232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956).
18 Id. at 123-28.
10 308 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1962).
20 Id. at 47.
21 Notes 1 & 3 sup ra.
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Second, a court might agree with the Commissioner and the dissenters
that there was no substance to the dividend: that the subsidiary was
employed as a conduit for the payment of a portion of the purchase
price of the stock. Finally, it could be contended that because (but
for the sale of stock necessitated by ICC regulation ") the taxpayer
might substantially have reduced its taxable income through liquidation
of the subsidiary, distribution of the assets to the parent, and subse-
quent sale by the parent to the purchaser, the taxpayer should not be
taxed on a $2,800,000 capital gain.24
Comparison of these alternative structurings of the transaction
illustrates the Code's inconsistent treatment of a corporation's dis-
position of its investment in a subsidiary. For some purposes the
parent is treated as an investor in the stock of the subsidiary: when
the parent disposes of its stock, gain is recognized in the amount of the
difference between the parent's basis in the stock and the amount re-
ceived from the sale. But for other purposes, the parent corporation
is treated as the owner of the subsidiary's assets. For instance, a
parent receiving property in a subsidiary's liquidating distribution will
incur no tax liability and, with one major exception, will receive the
basis that the property had in the hands of the subsidiary.2 In
Watermian, this inconsistency could permit widely disparate results:
a sale of stock yields $2,800,000 of income taxable as a capital gain;
but a liquidation of the subsidiary and sale of assets by the parent
results in no taxable gain to this taxpayer."
Noting that the Code treats a parent corporation as an investor
in the stock of its subsidiary for certain purposes and an owner of its
subsidiary's assets for other purposes provides no ready solution to
the disputed tax consequences of a pre-sale extraction of a subsidiary's
earnings and profits. The investor/owner dichotomy is more a
symptom of the Code's differing treatment of transactions having
22 Note 4 supra.
23 The subsidiaries were certified water carriers. Apparently, purchase of all the
subsidiaries' stock would have left the certified corporate entity unchanged such that
the Interstate Commerce Commission would not have found it necessary to reassess
the corporation's suitability for a certificate of public convenience. Obtaining ICC
certification after the purchaser's direct acquisition of the assets might have required
several years. For this reason the purchaser was unwilling to enter any transaction
which required ICC approval. 50 T.C. at 652-53.
24 No gain or loss is recognized on receipt by the parent corporation of property
distributed by its subsidiary in a complete liquidation. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 332.
The subsidiary recognizes neither gain nor loss on distribution of its assets in liquida-
tion. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 336. Property received by the parent carries with it
the adjusted basis that property had in the hands of the subsidiary. INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 334(b) (1). In Waterman the subsidiary's basis in its assets exceeded
$3,500,000; therefore, the parent would have realized no gain upon their sale at that
price and presumably would have incurred a recognizable loss. See 50 T.C. at 660.
25 An analogous inconsistency adheres in the Code's treatment of sales of assets
by the corporation, or by its shareholders after liquidation and distribution. See
United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1950).
2 6 See note 24 supra.
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identical economic consequences than a rationale for current taxation
of parent-subsidiary transactions. It does, however, demonstrate that
a parent corporation ordinarily has alternative ways of structuring the
sale of its subsidiary which reduce the parent's taxable income. In
Waterman, a fact extraneous to tax or economic considerations, the
buyer's concern with anticipated ICC scrutiny of a sale of assets, re-
stricted the taxpayer's alternatives. While the fact that a taxpayer
could have structured a transaction another way is not a good argument
for treating it as if he had done so, it does provide a reason for uphold-
ing a tax-minimizing form of the transaction if that form comports
with the letter and policy of the provisions relied on.
Section 243 implements a congressional policy that corporations
are not to be taxed on dividends received from affiliated corporations.
This policy substantially prevents multiple taxation of corporate earn-
ings as they pass from one corporation to another within the same chain
of beneficial ownership.2 7  However, deductibility under section 243
requires a "dividend" distribution; a pre-sale extraction of earnings and
profits conflicts with the conception of a dividend as a distribution of
earnings made in the context of an ongoing corporation-shareholder
relationship.2 In this light, a subsidiary's dividend declaration im-
mediately before the complete disposition of the parent's interest in
the stock of that subsidiary seems a hollow device lacking any business
objective other than the extraction of earnings and profits without divi-
dend consequences, especially when there is reason to believe no
dividend would have been paid but for the contemplated sale." Never-
theless, section 243 was specifically designed to prevent multiple taxa-
tion at the corporate level of earnings generated in a subsidiary and
distributed to its parent. In Waterman, the income generated by the
subsidiary never left corporate solution. It did become more readily
accessible to the parent's stockholders through conversion of the parent's
investment into cash, but a portion of the parent's investment is so
converted whenever a subsidiary pays a cash dividend.
CONCLUSION
The method sanctioned by the Tax Court complies with both the
letter and the congressional policy of section 243. Considering the
Code's inconsistent treatment of a parent's disposition of its investment
2 7 See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A62-63 (1954) ; S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 222 (1954).
28This conception is perhaps more an intuitive one than an interpretation of
§ 316's definition of a dividend. A dividend as defined for income tax purposes includes
any distribution by a corporation to its shareholders if it is made (1) out of accumu-lated earnings and profits, or (2) out of earnings and profits of the taxable year.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 316(a).
29According to the taxpayer, the parent corporation had considered an inter-
corporate dividend "for some time" prior to the sale. 60 T.C. at 653. But such an
assertion is easily made and difficult to disprove. There was no other evidence to
suggest the taxpayer would have caused a dividend declaration-especially of the size
actually declared-had a sale not been planned.
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in a subsidiary which normally allows a taxpayer a choice of tax results,
Waterman should not have been assessed a deficiency based on a
$2,800,000 capital gain.
Thus the Tax Court's decision allows the use of a pre-sale inter-
corporate dividend by a parent corporation planning the sale of a
prosperous subsidiary, as a ready means (other than a sale of assets)
by which to extract accumulated earnings and profits tax-free. Pre-
arrangement of the dividend, sale, and financing of the dividend ap-
parently will not jeopardize the desired tax benefit so long as the
contract of sale is not executed until after the dividend is declared and
paid to the seller.
